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POOR ENOUGH TO BE ELIGIBLE?
CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND THE
POVERTY REQUIREMENT
SUSAN VIVIAN MANGOLDt
An abused or neglected child must be poor to be eligible for
federal funds for foster care maintenance payments.1 The income
eligibility criteria forces agency workers to focus on the poverty
status of a child's family. The agency should instead focus
exclusively on the child and family's safety and service needs.
The income eligibility assessment results in billions of dollars of
irrelevant administrative determinations regarding the income
and assets of abused and neglected children and
their families. Ending the income eligibility for foster care
maintenance payments, even if federal funding was not
increased, could reallocate funds now wasted on income
determinations to the shelter, clothing, and food needs of
children in foster care. It would also formally disentangle child
welfare from poverty and the now-defunct Aid to Families with
Dependent Children ("AFDC") standards.
While no state law includes income eligibility in its definition
of child abuse or neglect, 2 the federal law mandates welfare-
t Vice Dean for Academics and Professor of Law, University at Buffalo Law
School. The author wishes to thank Professor Theresa Hughes for organizing Race,
Culture, Class, and Crisis in Child Welfare: Theory into Practice in November 2006
and for inviting me to participate. The author also wishes to acknowledge the
thorough research of Sheila Dickinson, Esq., on the Flemming Amendment and the
overall research assistance of Doug Johnston in preparing this article. Thanks to the
Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy for support in researching and presenting
this paper to a multidisciplinary audience as part of the Women, Families and
Economic Inequality: Critical Perspectives series at the University at Buffalo.
I See 42 U.S.C. §§ 670, 672-73 (2000) (regarding eligibility for foster care,
adoption assistance, and income eligibility based on July 1996 standards); 45 C.F.R.
§ 1356.71(d) (2007) ("Requirements subject to review. States will be reviewed
against the requirements of title IV-E of the Act regarding... (v) eligibility for
AFDC under such state plan as it was in effect on July 16, 1996.").
2 See ALA. CODE § 26-14-1(1)-(3) (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.290 (2007); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-201, 13-3623 (2006) (physical abuse); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-
503 (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165.1-.6 (West 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-
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eligibility for federal reimbursement of foster care and adoption
subsidies for children adopted out of foster care.3 Foster care and
adoption assistance subsidies are uncapped entitlement
programs under title IV-E of the Social Security Act and are
often referred to as "title IV-E programs." The November 2006
conference Race, Culture, Class, and Crisis in Child Welfare:
Theory into Practice at St. John's School of Law assembled child
advocates from practice and academics to address, in part, the
issue of class in child welfare law. Does income eligibility lead to
an undue focus on poor families as only they are eligible for
valuable federal funds? Does it enter into the risk assessment in
improper ways? Is poverty an overwhelming risk for child abuse
and neglect? Does the child protection system overwhelmingly
focus on poor families and their children to the detriment of these
families and of children from non-impoverished families who may
103 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-120 (2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 902 (2006);
D.C. CODE § 16-2301 (2001); FLA. STAT. § 39.01 (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5(b)
(2006); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-1 (2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1602 (2006); 325 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/3 (2001); IND. CODE §§ 31-9-2-0.5, 31-34-1-1 to -5, -9 to -11 (1999);
IOWA CODE § 232.68 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1502 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 600.020 (West 2006); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 603 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 4002 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-701 (LexisNexis 2007); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51A (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.622 (2005); MINN. STAT.
§§ 260C.007, 626.556 (2003); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-105 (2006); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 211.110 (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-102 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-710
(1995); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 432B.020, .070, .090, .100, .110, .140, .150 (2006); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:3 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6-8.9, -8.21 (West 2007);
N.M. STAT. §§ 30-6-1, 32A-4-2 (2003); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 371 (McKinney 2006);
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b (McKinney 2006) (abandonment definition); N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT § 1012 (McKinney 2006) (emotional abuse definition); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-
101 (2006); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-20-02, 50-25.1-02 (2006) (neglect and
abandonment); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.03(A), 2151.031 (LexisNexis 2006)
(neglect); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.011 (LexisNexis 2006) (emotional abuse);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01 (LexisNexis 2006) (sexual offenses); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2919.22 (LexisNexis 2006) (sexual abuse); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7102
(2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.005 (2005); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6102 (2001); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 40-11-2 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 26-8A-2 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-102, -602 (2006) (emotional and sexual
abuse); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.001 (Vernon 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-
402 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4912 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-100 (2006);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.44.020, .030 (2005); W. VA. CODE § 49-1-3 (2004); WIS. STAT.
§§ 48.02, 48.981 (2003) (neglect); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-202 (2006).
3 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 670, 672-73 (2000) (regarding eligibility for foster care,
adoption assistance, and income eligibility); 45 C.F.R. § 1356.71(d). This article
focuses on the interrelationship between public assistance and foster care, see 42
U.S.C. § 672, but the income eligibility requirements are the same for adoption
assistance, see 42 U.S.C. § 673.
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not get the attention and services they need? Is the child welfare
system in a crisis, due in part to its overemphasis on the poor?
This article provides background to these difficult empirical
questions and to the debate on class in the child welfare system
by describing the historical and current entanglement between
public assistance and federal foster care mandates and funding:
You must be eligible for public assistance to be eligible for foster
care maintenance payments. The article points out the lack of
analysis at the origin of the interrelationship between public
assistance and foster care. The importance of federal funding for
foster care through the public assistance program was minimized
and buried in other public assistance amendments that elicited
much greater attention and discussion. The article also exposes
the administrative and resource waste caused by the
continuation of the entanglement. The article proposes that all
questions regarding welfare eligibility be eliminated from
eligibility determinations for abused and neglected children and
that all administrative assessments exclusively focus on the
needs of the abused or neglected child and the child's family, not
on their income or financial assets.
Part One of the article first provides background to
understand current funding of the foster care system and then
reveals the historical origin of the placement of foster care and
other programmatic funding for abused and neglected children
within the public assistance program. While the interrelationship
between public assistance and services to abused and neglected
children can be traced to the Progressive Era, the 1960's brought
the formal codification of foster care funding mandates into the
Social Security Act's income maintenance program. As an end-of-
administration change in January 1961, 4 it was not thoroughly
considered, and the extent of the federal involvement was wildly
underestimated.
5
Part Two considers current eligibility requirements for foster
care funding in the Social Security Act. Eligibility for foster care,
independent living, and adoption assistance funding for abused
4 As explained in Part I, federal foster care funding was originally introduced
and tied to income eligibility in January 1961 under Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare Secretary Flemming of the Eisenhower administration,
before Secretary Ribicoff of the Kennedy administration assumed office and
continued the initiative. See infra Part I.
5 Original estimates of the total cost of federal funds for foster care were $3 to
$4 million. See H.R. REP. No. 87-307, at 1722 (1961) (Conf. Rep.).
2007]
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and neglected children remains tied to income eligibility
requirements related to public benefits in other social security
act provisions. 6 Part One argues that this connection never made
sense. Part Two continues this argument since today the
connection is particularly absurd. The current income
assessment is tied to standards for determining eligibility as of
1996 when Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC")
was still in place. Today, the AFDC program is defunct, replaced
in part by Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF").
Yet the funding eligibility for abused and neglected children is
still tied to the decade-old eligibility requirements.7 That archaic
determination is neither scaled for a cost-of-living increase nor
adjusted in any way to accommodate the circumstances of abused
and neglected children, especially abandoned children, who are
distinct from general income maintenance recipients and for
whom families' assets cannot be determined.
Part Three examines the administrative costs expended in
making income eligibility determinations. Increasingly, states
are outsourcing their eligibility determinations to maximize the
penetration rate. States aspire to qualify all eligible children for
federal reimbursement, and the assessment and documentation
of this qualification is extensive. Because of the importance in
dollars and cents to capturing as much federal funding as
possible, states increasingly outsource their income and
compliance determinations to maximize their reimbursement
rate. An outside company contracted to do this work then
receives a payment from the money that is collected from the
federal government. This is seen as a win/win contract since the
company receives a lucrative state contract but is paid from
money that otherwise would not have been drawn down from the
federal government to the state since the state is not as
successful in making eligibility determinations for abused and
neglected children. The losers in this arrangement are the
abused and neglected children and their families who are
receiving less direct services since money is instead spent in
administrative costs tied to income eligibility determinations.
6 See supra note 1.
7 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 606, 670, 672-673 (2000) (regarding eligibility for foster care,
adoption assistance, and income eligibility based on July 1996 standards); 45 C.F.R.
§ 1356.71(d).
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In the Conclusion, the argument is made to disentangle
eligibility for foster care, independent living, and adoption
assistance funding from child abuse and neglect service eligibility
determinations. Eligibility should be based on proper
determinations of abuse and neglect and the need for services.
By making all abused and neglected children, not just poor
children, eligible for federal reimbursement funds, the focus on
the poverty of the family would move from an eligibility
determination-"Are you poor enough to be eligible?"-to a
service-based determination. The question of family income
would not be irrelevant since it may be a necessary inquiry for
the agency to best meet the resource needs of the family, but in-
depth questions relating to items such as assets would not be the
first priority to determine eligibility. The federal money flowing
from the federal government to the states and local child welfare
agencies would not necessarily increase in total since the federal
government could adjust the percentages of reimbursement to
compensate for the larger pool of eligible children once income
was eliminated as a requirement. But, even if the funding did
not increase, the extensive drain of administrative costs to
determine income eligibility would be eliminated.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Background on Current Reimbursement
Inquiry into the federal reimbursement for foster care is
necessary to understand the workings of the child welfare system
in every state. State agencies try to maximize the federal dollars
flowing into their states. In its 2005 survey, the Urban Institute
reports that "[flederal funds were a little less than half of all
expenditures for child welfare activities. Based on analysis of
forty-seven states, federal funds accounted for 49 percent of total
spending, state funds for 39 percent, and local funds for 12
percent."8 The total federal spending for foster care maintenance
payments was $1.8 billion with an additional $2.1 billion for
administrative expenses.9  More resources are poured into
8 CYNTHIA ANDREWS SCARCELLA ET AL., THE URBAN INST., THE COST OF
PROTECTING VULNERABLE CHILDREN V: UNDERSTANDING STATE VARIATION IN
CHILD WELFARE FINANCING 9 (2006), available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?
ID=311314.
9 Id. at 15.
2007] 579
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administration-much of it for income determinations and then
compliance reports on the income determinations-than on
services.
The reimbursement rate varies from state to state based
upon the state per capita income. Poorer states are reimbursed
as much as 77 cents on the dollar, while states with the highest
income per capita are reimbursed at the rate of 50 cents on the
dollar for foster care maintenance payments. 10
If a child is abused or neglected, the state must provide the
necessary services, including foster care, whether or not the child
qualifies for federal maintenance payments. This means that for
a qualified child, the state may pay only 23 cents of state funds
for every dollar of placement services; but, for a non-qualified
child, the state must pay 100 percent of the cost with no federal
reimbursement. The percentage of children in out-of-home
placements who receive federal maintenance reimbursements
under title IV-E of the Social Security Act is called the state
penetration rate.
The key for states to increase the flow of federal money into
their child welfare programs and thereby save state dollars is to
increase the penetration rate by increasing the number of eligible
children who are administratively qualified for reimbursement.
States cannot affect whether a child is income-eligible, but they
can improve their administrative operations to ensure that all
eligible children are properly qualified for reimbursement. The
more children who receive federal foster care maintenance
payments, the higher the penetration rate. In State Fiscal Year
("SFY") 2004, the federal reimbursements to states for foster care
maintenance payments totaled $1.8 billion." These payments
"cover shelter, food, and clothing costs for eligible children in
care."12  The states make up the remaining costs for eligible
children based on the reimbursement rate. They also pay 100%
of the costs for non-eligible children.
To decrease the state funding exposure, states can either
increase the penetration rate or attempt to limit the number of
non-eligible children served by foster care. Eligibility requires
successfully meeting criteria set out in Title IV-E of the
Social Security Act: income eligibility, a voluntary placement
10 See id. at 9.
11 Id. at 11.
12 Id. at 14.
[Vol. 81:575580
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agreement or judicial determination, a qualified placement, and
a placement under the responsibility of the public agency. 13
13 42 U.S.C.S. § 672, which provides for foster care maintenance payments
program, reads:
(a) In general.
(1) Eligibility. Each State with a plan approved under this part shall
make foster care maintenance payments on behalf of each child who
has been removed from the home of a relative specified in section
406(a) [42 USCS § 606(a)] (as in effect on July 16, 1996) into foster
care if-
(A) the removal and foster care placement met, and the placement
continues to meet, the requirements of paragraph (2); and
(B) the child, while in the home, would have met the AFDC
eligibility requirement of paragraph (3).
(2) Removal and foster care placement requirements. The removal and
foster care placement of a child meet the requirements of this
paragraph if-
(A) the removal and foster care placement are in accordance
with-
(i) a voluntary placement agreement entered into by a parent
or legal guardian of the child who is the relative referred to in
paragraph (1); or
(ii) a judicial determination to the effect that continuation in
the home from which removed would be contrary to the
welfare of the child and that reasonable efforts of the type
described in section 471(a)(15) [42 USCS § 671(a)(15)] for a
child have been made;
(B) the child's placement and care are the responsibility of-
(i) the State agency administering the State plan approved
under section 471 [42 USCS § 671]; or
(ii) any other public agency with which the State agency
administering or supervising the administration of the State
plan has made an agreement which is in effect; and
(C) the child has been placed in a foster family home or child-care
institution.
(3) AFDC eligibility requirement.
(A) In general. A child in the home referred to in paragraph (1)
would have met the AFDC eligibility requirement of this
paragraph if the child-
(i) would have received aid under the State plan approved
under section 402 [42 USCS § 602] (as in effect on July 16,
1996) in the home, in or for the month in which the
agreement was entered into or court proceedings leading to
the determination referred to in paragraph (2)(A)(ii) of this
subsection were initiated; or
(ii) (I) would have received the aid in the home, in or for the
month referred to in clause (i), if application had been made
therefor; or
(II) had been living in the home within 6 months before the
month in which the agreement was entered into or the
proceedings were initiated, and would have received the aid
2007]
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This article focuses on the AFDC eligibility requirement
mandated in 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(3). The article argues for
elimination of this income and asset eligibility. The income
eligibility requirement serves no historic or current purpose but
costs billions in administrative costs annually and results in
focused attention on public assistance-eligible children and a
disincentive to serve the less-financially needy. If this
requirement were eliminated, states would be relieved from
tremendous administrative expenses as detailed in Parts Two
and Three, and more money could be used for foster care
maintenance payments from the administrative savings. There
in or for such month, if, in such month, the child had been
living in the home with the relative referred to in paragraph
(1) and application for the aid had been made.
(B) Resources determination. For purposes of subparagraph (A), in
determining whether a child would have received aid under a
State plan approved under section 402 [42 USCS § 602] (as in
effect on July 16, 1996), a child whose resources (determined
pursuant to section 402(a)(7)(B) [42 USCS § 602(a)(7)(B)], as so in
effect) have a combined value of not more than $10,000 shall be
considered a child whose resources have a combined value of not
more than $1,000 (or such lower amount as the State may
determine for purposes of section 402(a)(7)(B) [42 USCS
§ 602(a)(7)(B)]).
(4) Eligibility of certain alien children. Subject to title IV of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, if the child is an alien disqualified under section 245A(h) or
210(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 USCS § 1255a(h) or
1160(f)] from receiving aid under the State plan approved under
section 402 [42 USCS § 602] in or for the month in which the
agreement described in paragraph (2)(A)(i) was entered into or court
proceedings leading to the determination described in paragraph
(2)(A)(ii) were initiated, the child shall be considered to satisfy the
requirements of paragraph (3), with respect to the month, if the child
would have satisfied the requirements but for the disqualification.
(b) Additional qualifications. Foster care maintenance payments may be
made under this part [42 USCS §§ 670 et seq.] only on behalf of a child
described in subsection (a) of this section who is-
(1) in the foster family home of an individual, whether the payments
therefor are made to such individual or to a public or private child-
placement or child-agency, or
(2) in a child-care institution, whether the payments therefor are made
to such institution or to a public or private child-placement or child-
care agency, which payments shall be limited so as to include in such
payments only those items which are included in the term "foster care
maintenance payments" (as defined in section 475(4) [42 USCS
§ 675(4)]).
42 U.S.C.S. § 672 (LexisNexis 2007).
[Vol. 81:575
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would still remain eligibility requirements for federal
reimbursement: judicial determinations or voluntary placement
agreements; agency supervision; and qualified placements; but
these three requirements protect the child and family.
B. Historical Background to the Foster Care/Public Assistance
Entanglement
Child neglect and the generally-used term of "child abuse
and neglect" have been closely linked to poverty throughout our
history, dating back as early as colonial times and Progressive
Era interventions. 14 The entanglement with public assistance
can directly be drawn from 1908 when President Theodore
Roosevelt convened the White House Conference on Dependent
Children. The conference was concerned, in part, with the plight
of newly-widowed women and their children. Thought of as
guiltless in their single parenthood and worthy of public support
for their mothering, the conference considered ways of partially
assisting these women so their children could be raised by them
at home. The suggestion of Mother's Pensions emerged.
States began to introduce Mother's Pensions in 1911 as a
mechanism to keep children at home instead of placing them
away from their widowed or single mothers and forcing the
mothers to work long full-time hours. The pensions were not
enough for a family to rely upon exclusively, but could augment a
partial income. States used varying eligibility requirements, and
the pensions were not offered uniformly within or between states.
By 1935, all but two states had some form of Mother's Pensions
available.
15
In 1935, Aid to Dependent Children was initiated as a
federal program operated by states to provide income assistance
to poor children in the model of Mother's Pensions. From the
outset, states set the eligibility criteria for their programs.
Income eligibility and other criteria varied between states, and
some states denied assistance to children whose homes were not
14 See Susan Vivian Mangold, Challenging the Parent-Child-State Triangle in
Public Family Law: The Importance of Private Providers in the Dependency System,
47 BUFF. L. REV. 1397, 1412-29 (1999).
15 See Jo Anne B. Ross, Fifty Years of Service to Children and Their Families, 48
SOC. SECURITY BULL. 5, 6 (1985). See generally MATTHEW A. CRENSON, BUILDING
THE INVISIBLE ORPHANAGE: A PREHISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE SYSTEM
(1998).
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deemed "suitable." The suitability determination was left to the
discretion of individual states, local offices, and individual
workers. It could be a consideration based on the appearance of
the home environment or any other factors that the state codes or
individual caseworker deemed worthy of judgment. The
determination was often in regard to the "moral environment" of
the home. This translated into whether or not the mother was
living with a man who was not her husband or had a child out of
wedlock. The notions of worthiness for motherhood and for
public assistance remained an integral part of eligibility
determinations.
By 1960, twenty-four states had reference to "suitable
homes" in their ADC programs. 16 Of those, sixteen states made
the reference as part of their guidelines for agency plans to
remediate the conditions in the child's best interest and continue
payment while the remedial plan was being implemented.
Eight states used the "suitability" determination as an
eligibility requirement and denied aid to children who were
in homes that were not deemed suitable. 17  Once this
determination was made, the children could be left in the homes
but aid would be terminated. There was no requirement that a
plan be implemented or even-developed to improve the conditions
in the home. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
took note of these practices and criticized them in their
publications. 18
Before the National Biennial Round Table Conference of the
American Public Welfare Association, Secretary Flemming
stated:
There is the issue of illegitimacy as it relates to the aid for
dependent children program. Personally, I am completely out of
sympathy with efforts to deal with this problem by denying aid
to the illegitimate child. I could never reconcile myself to a
program that puts itself in a position of turning its back on the
needs of a child because of the sins of the parents. Not only am
I convinced this would be wrong, but I am also convinced that it
would make no contribution to the basic problem. 19
16 Statement of Secretary Abraham Ribicoff, 1961 HEW ANN. REP. 62-63.
17 See id.
18 Kathryn D. Goodwin, Twenty-Five Years of Public Assistance, 23 SOC.
SEcuRiTY BULL. 31, 35 (1960).
19 Address by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, The Honorable
Arthur S. Fleming, 18 PUB. WELFARE 4, 5 (1960).
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Despite these criticisms from professional groups and
administrative officials, discretion in eligibility standards,
including suitability determinations, remained with the states.
In 1960, Louisiana enacted legislation to terminate
approximately 23,000 children from the ADC rolls because their
homes did not meet the suitability requirement. In this process,
suitability was determined based on the mother's "moral
behavior" and not on such conditions as the home setting or
upbringing of her children.
In this instance, State legislation denied assistance to children
if the adult caretaker was living with, but not legally married
to, a mate; or if the mother had an illegitimate child at any time
since first receiving assistance, unless she could prove to a
parish welfare board that she had ceased illicit relationships
and was maintaining a suitable home for her children. 20
There was a strong reaction to the termination of assistance
to so many needy children. Many welfare professional
organizations and citizen groups demanded a response from the
federal agency, citing the childrens' needs and the clear racial
overtones to the cessation of aid. In the Fall of 1960, toward the
end of the Eisenhower administration, Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare Arthur Flemming held a hearing to
determine whether Louisiana's ADC plan was being
administered in a manner consistent with the requirements of
the Social Security Act in light of these large-scale terminations
of benefits. Again, national organizations participated and
submitted testimony and resolutions arguing against the
suitability requirements.
The suitability of the home for the proper care of a child should
not be an eligibility factor in the ADC program. The standards
of suitability should be no different for families assisted through
ADC than they are for the general community. If any home is
unsuitable regardless of the financial circumstances of the
family, the community through its established social and law
enforcement agencies has a responsibility to take steps to
improve conditions and protect the children.
21
20 1961 STATEMENT OF SECRETARY ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH,
EDUC. AND WELFARE ANN. REP., at 62-63.
21 See, e.g., Public Welfare Services and Aid to Dependent Children: A Statement
of Program Objectives: Hearing on H.R. before the Comm. on Ways & Means, 87th
Cong. 1st Sess. 218-19 (Feb. 1961) (statement of the Board of Directors of the
American Public Welfare Association).
2007]
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In the wake of this public outcry, Louisiana revised its state
plan, and the Secretary approved it for continued federal
reimbursement under the ADC program. Also in January 1961,
in the waning hours of his administration, Secretary Flemming
issued an Executive Order, effective June 30, 1961, stating that
federal grants under the ADC program would not be made to
states terminating assistance to children in unsuitable homes
unless the states provided out-of-home placement for those
children. If the states provided such placement as an alternative
to in-home ADC funding, the federal government would
reimburse states for those costs under ADC grant allotments.
22
The other alternative was to leave the child at home and
maintain the income assistance to the family while providing
remedial services, if appropriate, to make the homes suitable for
children.
Federal funding for foster care was formally connected to the
public assistance program by this executive order that was issued
in immediate response to the actions of the Louisiana legislature.
The broader context of the executive order was not a debate on
the link between poverty and abuse or neglect or any other
thoughtful discussion. Instead, the order was issued to change
the practices of eight states operating under suitability
requirements. The discussions around this order considered the
problems for children in enforcing suitability requirements, not
the importance of the initiative to provide new federal funds for
out-of-home placements and link foster care to public assistance.
In the Spring of 1961, Congress passed legislation to codify
the executive order as amendments to the Social Security Act.
Secretary Flemming's successor, Abraham Ribicoff, echoed
Flemming's concerns regarding suitability requirements when he
assumed office: "The problem of the child or the community is
not solved by denying assistance while leaving the child in
endangering conditions."23  Still, there was little debate and
certainly no comprehensive examination of the implications of
linking ADC to foster care. Instead, the focus of the legislative
debates in both houses was on other amendments allowing ADC
payments to families with unemployed parents, thus eliminating
22 See S. REP. No. 87-165, at 6 (1961).
23 1960 U.S. DEP'T HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE ANN. REP. (quoting A Report of
the Advisory Counsel on Public Assistance (Dec. 1959)).
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the requirement that children had to live with a single parent to
be eligible for ADC.
2 4
The limited debate of the foster care provision that took
place was not substantive but instead focused on the ability of
the impacted states that still had suitability requirements to
amend their provisions. There was concern expressed that these
states, some of which had legislatures that only convened
biannually, needed an effective date of the amendments that
gave them adequate time to amend their laws and change their
state plans to comply with the new directives.
The legislation was passed in May 1961, but the effective
date was postponed from July 1, 1961 to allow five states to
amend their state plans and thereby provide for continued
assistance to the children's homes or removal of the children.
Two states had legislation in place that prohibited them from
removing the suitability requirements, so they were given
additional time for their legislatures to pass the necessary
changes to put them in compliance with the new federal
mandate. 25 The amendments were initially limited to fourteen
months, and this short-term allotment further minimized the
impact of the change.
Secretary Ribicoff announced the new legislation in the
Social Security Bulletin of July, 1961:
Among the children receiving public assistance, as among all
children, there are some living in homes where they are not
receiving proper care and protection. Under the new law, from
May 1, 1961, to June 30, 1962, these children may continue to
receive aid to dependent children, with the Federal Government
sharing in the cost, even though they are removed from their
homes by court order and placed in foster-family homes.
Under the new law the Federal Government will participate in
payments for foster-family care for a dependent child under the
following conditions: (1) He would otherwise meet the existing
definition of dependent child except for his removal after April
30, 1961, from his home by a court that has found that it is
contrary to the child's welfare to continue living there; (2) the
assistance agency is responsible for his placement and care;
(3) he is placed in a foster-family home as a result of the judicial
24 See S. REP. NO. 87-165, at 6; H.R. REP. NO. 87-307, at 1-3 (1961) (Conf. Rep.).
25 See S. REP. No. 87-165, at 6; 1961 STATEMENT OF SEC'Y ABRAHAM RIBICOFF,
U.S. DEP'T HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE ANN. REP., at 62-63.
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determination; and (4) he received aid to dependent children in
or for the month in which the court action was initiated.
26
The lack of attention and consideration given to the new
provisions was further exemplified by the minimization of the
financial cost of the amendments allowing ADC money to be used
for foster care payments. The Conference Report on the bill
estimated that the new foster care allotments would cost between
$3 million and $4 million. The conference report on the bill (H.
Rep. 307) was filed April 25, 1961.
It was estimated that $200 million would be the cost of
extending aid to dependent children benefits to families of the
unemployed for the 14-month period.
Additional costs of $15 million were expected from other
provisions of the bill, including $10 million for increased federal
payments for medical aid to public assistance recipients and $3-
$4 million for aid for children placed in foster homes.
27
The Public Welfare Association echoed the cost estimates of
Congress in minimizing the impact of the foster care provisions:
Most of the children who will now receive ADC while in foster-
care would have remained in their own homes as ADC
recipients, had this legislation not been passed. Therefore, it is
not expected to add substantial numbers of children to the
public assistance rolls. The additional federal costs will
probably range between three and four million dollars for the
14-month period of operation. The expenditures will be little,
but the results will be extremely rewarding, in terms of the new
security and opportunity provided to children threatened by
unfortunate home environments.
28
While projecting that the foster care amendments would
impact a small number of cases and cost little, there were
important requirements imposed on these cases. These were the
first federal mandates for foster care and included a judicial
determination of the necessity of the placement or a voluntary
agreement and ongoing casework by the ADC worker who had to
maintain responsibility for the qualified placement. These
mandates prompted some to view the amendments as an
26 Div. of Program Standards and Dev., Amendments to the Public Assistant
Provisions of the Social Security Act, 24 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 18, 18-19 (1961).
27 Major Legislation-Education and Welfare, Almanac, 17 CONG. Q. 282 (87th
Cong. 1st sess. 1961).
28 Wilbur J. Cohen, Public Welfare Legislative Progress: 1961, 19 J. AM. PUB.
WELFARE ASS'N 123 (1961).
[Vol. 81:575
POOR ENOUGH TO BE ELIGIBLE?
opportunity to impact the foster care system by legislating
mandates in a small number of cases that would then serve as
casework models. Judicial orders necessitating placement would
discourage unnecessary placements. Caseworker oversight
would prevent children from "getting lost in the system" and
ensure the proper provision of services to families.
Though the foster-care legislation for ADC children is limited, it
is expected to stimulate and assist the states in protecting and
caring for children under proper safeguards-that is, under the
continuing watchfulness of the public welfare agencies.
Moreover, the new law will further stimulate the use of
professionally trained staff who are skilled and experienced in
the placement and supervision of children outside their own
homes.29
The codification of federal foster care reimbursement and the
accompanying mandates within the income maintenance
provisions of the Social Security Act may have had little
foresight at the outset, but have, nonetheless, continued to
the present. The eligibility criteria for foster care still refer back
to the income eligibility guidelines for public assistance over a
decade ago. This maintains the entanglement between the foster
care system and the income maintenance provisions. It not only
requires that children be abused and neglected, but they also
must be poor to be eligible for federal reimbursement for foster
care.
II. CURRENT ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERAL
REIMBURSEMENT FOR FOSTER CARE
The entitlement to public assistance originally enacted under
the Aid to Dependent Children program and later the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program was terminated in
1996 under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act.30  This law changed public assistance to
provide only time-limited income maintenance to poor families
under the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program. 31
The eligibility for foster care funding was not changed as a result
of these amendments. Instead, the current "qualifying children"
29 Id.
30 Pub. L. No. 104-93, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
31 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (2000).
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standards refer back to the eligibility criteria as they were in
effect on July 16, 1996, under the entitlement to the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program.
32
The income eligibility requirements under the current Social
Security Act foster care provisions continue the historical
mandate that an abused or neglected child must be poor to be
eligible for federal foster care funds:
§ 672. Foster care maintenance payments program
(a) In general.
(1) Eligibility.
Each State with a plan approved under this part shall make
foster care maintenance payments on behalf of each child
who has been removed from the home of a relative specified
in section 406(a) [42 USCS § 606(a)] (as in effect on July 16,
1996) into foster care if-
(B) the child, while in the home, would have met the
AFDC eligibility requirement of paragraph (3).
(3) AFDC eligibility requirement.
(A) In general.
A child in the home referred to in paragraph (1) would
have met the AFDC eligibility requirement of this
paragraph if the child-
(i) would have received aid under the State plan
approved under section 402 [42 USCS § 602] of this
title (as in effect on July 16, 1996) . . .33
As explained by the Urban Institute:
PRWORA eliminated the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children ("AFDC") program, also an uncapped entitlement
program. However, states are still required to determine
eligibility for title IV-E Foster Care and Adoption Assistance
based on a child's eligibility for AFDC as it existed in their
state's plan on July 16, 1996. Therefore, states must base a
child's eligibility for title IV-E on a program and need standards
that no longer exist in practice and are not adjusted for
inflation.34
32 42 U.S.C.S. § 672(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2007).
33 42 U.S.C.S. § 672 (LexisNexis 2007).
34 SCARCELLA ET AL., supra note 8, at 1-2.
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The Social Security Act contains additional eligibility
provisions beyond the AFDC eligibility requirement. States
cannot change the income and assets of the child's family. The
state can work more competently to qualify all income eligible
children, but it cannot actually change their family's income
eligibility. On the other hand, the state can directly impact the
other Social Security Act requirements under 42 U.S.C. § 672:
(2) Removal and foster care placement requirements.
The removal and foster care placement of a child meet the
requirements of this paragraph if-
(A) the removal and foster care placement are in accordance
with-
(i) a voluntary placement agreement entered into by a
parent or legal guardian of the child who is the relative
referred to in paragraph (1); or
(ii) a judicial determination to the effect that
continuation in the home from which removed would be
contrary to the welfare of the child and that reasonable
efforts of the type described in section 471(a)(15) [42
USCS § 671(a)(15)] for a child have been made;
(B) the child's placement and care are the responsibility of-
(i) the State agency administering the State plan
approved under section 471 [42 USCS § 671]; or
(ii) any other public agency with which the State agency
administering or supervising the administration of the
State plan has made an agreement which is in effect;
and
(C) the child has been placed in a foster family home or
child-care institution.35
The requirements under paragraph (2) referred to above still
maintain the "model" provisions from 1961 requiring a judicial
determination or voluntary placement agreement, oversight by
the public agency, and qualified foster care setting.36  The
strategy is to be sure that all income-eligible children meet these
mandates so that they can receive foster care reimbursement.
Non-AFDC-eligible children who fail to meet the requirements of
42 U.S.C. § 472(a)(1) & (3) cannot receive Title IV-E funds even if
they meet the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(2). Attempting
to maximize federal dollars flowing into their states, thus
35 42 U.S.C.S. § 672(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2007).
36 Id.
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increasing their penetration rates, public agencies may alter
their practice to meet the federal mandates. For instance, a non-
AFDC eligible child may be placed with a relative in a non-
qualified out-of-home placement since this is deemed the best
placement for the child. Since the child cannot receive federal
foster care maintenance funds since they are not AFDC-eligible,
the fact that they also fail to meet the requirement of a qualified
placement is irrelevant. On the other hand, a public agency has
a fiscal incentive to place an eligible child only in a qualified
foster care setting, even if a non-foster care relative caretaker
setting is best for the child, so that the agency can receive up to
77 cents on the dollar for the costs of the placement from the
federal government. Thus, income eligibility can drive
caseworker determinations. This is not always in the best
interest of individual children. The Urban Institute, reporting on
their 2005 Child Welfare survey, explains:
The average penetration rate in SFY 2004 was 52 percent
(based on 46 states). Between SFYs 2002 and 2004, the
penetration rate in 11 states increased while the penetration
rate in 22 states declined. Analysis of 36 states that provided
information on their penetration rate for SFYs 2000, 2002, and
2004 shows the foster care penetration rate consistently
declining, from 58 to 55 to 54 percent. To ensure that all
income-eligible children are determined eligible and to help
counter the negative effect of the link to AFDC, many states
improved the eligibility determination process by refining the
court's role in eligibility determinations, creating specific
eligibility units to help regiment the process, and even shifting
their policies away from the use of noneligible placements such
as unlicensed relatives.
37
As penetration rates gradually decline and states struggle to
collect the information necessary to qualify more children under
the income eligibility requirements, the "model requirements"
have been altered to streamline the qualification process. As
described above, courts may be given a more limited role such as
completing a form with a check mark rather than recording a full
determination of the need for placement on the record. This may
be detrimental later in a case when the court record does not
explain all the reasons for placement and the justification for
termination is then harder to assess. It may, however, be more
37 SCARCELLA ET AL., supra note 8, at vi.
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reliable in assuring an AFDC-eligible child meets the judicial
determination criteria under 42 U.S.C. § 672. The other
eligibility criteria are generally in the best interests of the child,
but the drive for the best penetration rate leads to adherence
only for poor children even when they are not executed in the
best interest of the individual child.
The same type of funding considerations can influence
placement determinations. If a relative is the best placement for
a child but does not qualify as a foster parent placement, the
agency must choose between competing concerns. Should the
agency choose placement with the relative or place the child in a
foster home that will qualify for federal reimbursement? Should
the agency move the child out of the protection system entirely
and leave it to the relative caregiver to provide necessary
protection for the child? These decisions can be made in the best
interest of the child and family or as a result of funding concerns
for an AFDC-eligible child.
The requirements further demand a poverty assessment by a
mandated determination of assets as required under the income
maintenance provisions of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 672(a)(3) requires:
(B) Resources determination. For purposes of subparagraph
(A), in determining whether a child would have received aid
under a State plan approved under section 402 [42 USCS § 602]
(as in effect on July 16, 1996), a child whose resources
(determined pursuant to section 402(a)(7)(B) [42 USCS
§ 602(a)(7)(B)], as so in effect) have a combined value of not
more than $10,000 shall be considered a child whose resources
have a combined value of not more than $1,000 (or such lower
amount as the State may determine for purposes of section
402(a)(7)(B) [42 USCS § 602(a)(7)(B)]).
38
Dating the income eligibility to 1996 standards and
requiring an asset determination causes several problems for
abused and neglected children. First, freezing the eligibility as of
July 1996 holds income at decade-old levels. The cost of living
increase varies by state, but inflation over ten years makes the
1996 AFDC eligibility levels require that families be poorer in
2007 in order to qualify in 2007 since there has been no
adjustment of the levels for inflation since 1996. This makes it
more difficult for children to qualify for the foster care
38 42 U.S.C.S. § 672(a)(3)(B) (LexisNexis 2007).
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reimbursement and results in fewer federal dollars flowing into
states for foster care services.
This concern was raised and answered directly in the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services Administration for
Children and Families' Child Welfare Policy Manual. The
question was posed, 'May States adjust the 1996 standard of
need to reflect cost of living adjustments?"39 Citing the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
the response was a resounding, "No."40  The Department of
Health and Human Services ("HHS") went on to explain:
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act ("PRWORA") did not include any allowance
for cost of living or adjustments for inflation in setting the July
16, 1996 look-back date. States may not adjust the 1996
standard of need to reflect cost of living adjustments, since the
statutory look-back date is set at a specific point in time.41
Requiring an income and asset determination of the family
poses unique problems for abused and neglected children. One
paradigmatic child in the child protection system in need of foster
care is an abandoned child. If a child was left on the doorstep of
the public agency with no identifying information, that child
could not be qualified for federal reimbursement for foster care
since it would be impossible to determine the income and asset
eligibility of the child's family. HHS confronted this paradox in
responding to states' questions in its policy manual, "How does a
State determine title IV-E eligibility for an abandoned child
whose parents are unknown?"
Answer: It is unlikely that a State would be able to determine
title IV-E eligibility for an abandoned child whose parents are
unknown. This situation differs from one in which a parent
leaves a child with a friend or relative and is unreachable, but
the identity of the parent is known. In either scenario, all of the
title IV-E eligibility requirements must be met for a child on
whose behalf title IV-E foster care or adoption assistance is
claimed. This includes the requirement that the child meet the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) eligibility
requirements as outlined at section[s] [sic] 472(a)(3) and
39 ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
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473(a)(2) of the Social Security Act. As such, the State must be
able to establish and verify financial need and deprivation of
parental support based on the home from which the child was
removed. Determining a child's financial need requires a State
to examine the parents' income and resources. In the case in
which the identity of the parents is unknown, including when a
child has been abandoned, the State will not have any financial
information on which to make an AFDC eligibility
determination. A State must document that a child meets all
AFDC eligibility requirements; a State cannot presume that a
child would meet the eligibility requirements simply because
the child has been abandoned.
42
In its Children's Foster Care Manual, the State of Michigan
makes clear, under the Title IV-E Eligibility Requirements, that
"[c]hildren, whose parents or other relatives cannot be identified"
and "[clhildren whose parents will not cooperate in the eligibility
determination" are not "ADC eligible as there are no facts upon
which to base former ADC program eligibility."
43
If a child is found by a court to be an abused or neglected
child under the state statutes and is further found to be in need
of placement, even if that child is placed in an eligible foster care
setting, the state cannot be reimbursed for the costs of that
child's shelter, food, and clothing unless the child's family would
have qualified for AFDC under the 1996 standard. The child
must be poor enough to be eligible.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS FOR ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATIONS
In order to meet federal requirements, a child must have
been eligible for AFDC under the July 1996 standard to be
eligible for foster care reimbursement today.44  This is a
complicated, time-consuming assessment. For example, the state
of Iowa provides a 143-page manual to assist with Determining
Title IV-E Eligibility.45 The introduction explains:
42 Id. at Q/A #19.
43 STATE OF MICH. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN'S FOSTER CARE
MANUAL, CFF 902-2, at 4-5 (2006), available at http://www.mfia.state.mi.us/
olmweb/ex/cff/902-2.pdf.
44 See 42 U.S.C.S. § 672(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2007).
45 IOWA DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., EMPLOYEES' MANUAL, DETERMINING TITLE
IV-E ELIGIBILITY (2004), available at www.dhs.state.ia.us/policyanalysis/Policy
ManualPages/ManualDocumentsMaster/13-b.pdf.
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The Title TV-E Foster Care Assistance program's purpose is to
help states provide proper care for children who need temporary
placement outside their homes in a foster family home or group
care facility. This program is an open-ended entitlement
program that provides funds to assist states with the costs of
foster care maintenance for eligible children.
The Title IV-E program also provides funds to support staff
training and administrative costs. Claims for administrative
costs under Title IV-E help to pay for staff salaries, supplies,
and related expenses. Programs for the training of new
workers, continuous education of current workers, training for
foster families, and training of staff in foster care facilities all
benefit from funds provided through Title IV-E.
46
The Manual goes on to explain the importance of the federal
funds for state funding of the child welfare system generally:
If a child or DHS does not meet the requirements to claim IV-E
funds, the child can receive the same foster care or adoption
services. However, it means that less money is available to
serve all children and families in Iowa. Federal financial
participation in state expenditures is provided: [a]t the
Medicaid match rate of approximately 60% for foster care
maintenance and ... [a]t a 50% match rate for related state
administrative expenditures, such as time spent for case
management and eligibility determination.... For every five
children in foster care who qualify for matching funds under
title IV-E, enough state funds are saved to pay the expenses for
three more children in the same type setting.
47
Using data from 2004, the Urban Institute reports, "52
percent of children in out-of-home placements were receiving title
IV-E maintenance payments.... Nationally, the penetration
rate continues to decline." 48  Officials from ten states were
interviewed by the Urban Institute to understand this decline.
The findings are clear: "All of the administrators in the ten
interviewed states pointed to the link to AFDC as the primary
reason why children are not eligible for title IV-E."49 States have
increased their administrative costs, in part, to ensure that all
46 Id. at 1.
47 Id. at 2.
48 SCARCELLA ET AL., supra note 8, at 15. The study shows that the penetration
rate in 36 analyzed states dropped from 58 percent to 55 percent to 54 percent in
SFY's 2000, 2002, and 2004, respectively. Id.
49 Id. at 16.
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eligible children receive federal foster care reimbursement.
States cannot impact whether or not a child is income eligible,
but they can improve their administrative practices for
determining eligibility to increase their penetration rate and
thereby increase the flow of federal dollars into their state.
States can work to improve the flow of cases through the
judicial system to ensure that the necessary findings are made in
each case where placement is made. States can also diminish or
altogether eliminate the use of non-eligible placements by placing
all children in licensed foster homes, requiring that even
relatives acquire the proper licensing or be disqualified as
placements. Finally, states can document the oversight provided
for each placement by the public agency. These steps may be
necessary to meet the eligibility requirements for federal
reimbursement under title IV-E.50 States must still meet the
requirements of income eligibility for each child to claim federal
reimbursement for that child's out-of-home care.
In 2004, title IV-E foster care funds distributed to states
totaled $3.9 billion. 51 Of that total, $1.8 billion was spent on
maintenance payments (shelter, food, and clothing) for eligible
children in out-of-home care. The remaining $2.1 billion was
spent on administrative costs and training and the automated
information service. While both maintenance payments and
administrative payments increased approximately 2% from 2002
to 2004, the spending for administration continues to exceed the
spending for actual service delivery maintenance payments.
52
Across the states, funding for administrative expenses
ranges from just over $300 million to just under $500 million.53
While this is a wide margin of variation, the clearer picture
emerges when the ratio of administration to maintenance
payments is examined. States spend a low of 3 cents on
administration for every dollar spent on maintenance payments
to a high of $7.59 for administration for every dollar spent on
maintenance. 54  Much of this variation in the ratio of
administration to maintenance costs is attributed to what is put
into the category of "administrative costs." Some states include a
50 See 42 U.S.C.S. § 672(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2007).
51 SCARCELLA ET AL., supra note 8, at 15.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 17.
54 Id.
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much broader range of activity in this category than others. In
sum, more money is spent on administration than on services,
and a significant portion of these administrative expenses are
due to income eligibility determinations and then the compliance
reports to prove they made these determinations.
To maximize their penetration rate, states have begun to
outsource their income eligibility determinations. Companies
such as Maximus, Inc., contract with states to increase their
penetration and compliance rates and in turn receive a
percentage of the funds collected. This private subcontracting
has a long history in the child welfare system, 55 but in the past
private entities were performing agency activities that directly
impacted children and families. Today, states are increasingly
subcontracting to fulfill purely administrative eligibility
determinations to meet federal requirements with no benefit to
the children in the system or to their families.
The motto for Maximus, Inc., the most active of the
subcontractors of administrative eligibility determinations, is
"Helping Government Serve the People." 56  In Wisconsin,
Maximus received nine percent of the funds it collected under a
contract in 2002-2003 for a total of $1,004,700. During 2003-
2004, under a reallocation plan, $714,400 was encumbered to
operate a title IV-E eligibility determination unit on a statewide
basis under contract with Maximus. 57 Additionally, the state
contracted with Maximus to improve the state's compliance in
anticipation of its next review for title IV-E compliance. 58 The
Child Welfare Division of Maximus' clients include the State of
Florida, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, State of Indiana, State
of Illinois, and State of Connecticut. 59  Each of these states
benefits from the management services of Maximus in
maximizing their penetration rate. Much of this reimbursed
funding is in turn spent on income eligibility determinations to
55 See Susan Vivian Mangold, Protection, Privatization, and Profit in the Foster
Care System, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1295, 1309-13 (1999).
56 Maximus, Child Welfare Program Management Services, http://www.
maximus.com/corporate/pages/childwelfarepgmmgmtsvs.asp (last visited Feb. 6,
2007).
57 Memorandum from Bob Lang, Dir., State of Wis. Legislative Fiscal Bureau
Joint Comm. on Finance, to Comm. Members 4 (Nov. 10, 2003), http://www.legis.
wisconsin.gov/lfb/Sectionl310/111003_DHFS_6.pdf.
58 Id. at 5.
59 Maximus, supra note 56.
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prove to the federal government that children are poor enough to
be eligible for foster care maintenance payments.
CONCLUSION
The November 2006 conference, Race, Culture, Class, and
Crisis in Child Welfare: Theory into Practice at St. John's School
of Law critically challenged the existing make-up of the child
welfare system in terms of race, culture, and class. To
understand the class dynamics of the system, this article
explores the historical linkage of AFDC to federal foster care
reimbursement. The historical story that emerges is of an end-
of-administration executive order prompted by discriminatory
practices in the state of Louisiana in 1960. Neither the executive
order providing federal foster care funds tied to ADC eligibility
nor the subsequent federal legislation amending the Social
Security Act to provide the federal reimbursement for foster
care critically examined the public assistance-child welfare
connection.
That connection persists today despite the repeal of AFDC.
The eligibility criteria remain on the Social Security Act books
simply for foster care and other child welfare system eligibility
determinations. The administrative costs of making these
determinations are unconscionable, especially given the limited
resources appropriated for foster care services.
Foster care should be disentangled from public assistance by
eliminating the eligibility calculations. This would take poverty
out of the eligibility criteria and leave resource calculations solely
for service-planning purposes. In this way, all determinations
would be to benefit the child, not merely to classify the child.
Poverty would not be formally equated with abuse and neglect.
While there may be many reasons why poor children make up a
large percentage of abused and neglected children in state care,
elimination of federal income eligibility requirements would
begin to remove improper incentives and disincentives based on
poverty and not on service needs. Medicaid and Title XX
eligibility define abused and neglected children into the
programs regardless of income. The same could be true for all
children determined to need foster care services: The state would
receive federal reimbursement for their foster care services
irrespective of income and assets.
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Eliminating the wasteful costs of income eligibility
determinations would free more public money for service
delivery. States could better serve children if they were freed
from the federally mandated question: Are you poor enough to be
eligible?
